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Recently, central banks expanded their balance sheets by unconventional actions,
including credit easing operations. Although such quasi-￿scal operations are signi￿cant
in size and assumed to be crucial for the economy￿ s recovery, little theory is available
to explain the possible macroeconomic consequences of these operations. The main
contribution of this paper is to show that quasi-￿scal shocks may a⁄ect in￿ ation in
plausible cases by utilizing a simple DSGE model that embraces the budgetary inde-
pendence of the central banks. In the active quasi-￿scal policy regime, the shocks in
the central bank￿ s earnings alter the private agent￿ s portfolio between consumption
and the nominal money balance, thus a⁄ecting in￿ ation. Conventional macroeconomic
models have implicitly assumed policy regimes in which the aforementioned mechanism
does not restrict equilibria; however, this paper shows that such assumptions generally
are not guaranteed to hold. The extensions of the basic model show that quasi-￿scal
shocks may produce undesirable e⁄ects, such as in￿ ation following de￿ ationary mone-
tary policy during the implementation of exit strategy.
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Recently, central banks expanded the size of their balance sheets in an attempt to mitigate the
￿nancial turmoil that began in 2008. In order to accomplish this goal, various unconventional
operations were implemented, such as a liquidity provision to households and businesses,
bailouts to ￿nancial institutions and foreign exchange swaps with foreign central banks.
All of the above-mentioned operations in￿ ated the central banks￿balance sheets, and the
magnitude of these operations was signi￿cant.1 These operations can be referred to as ￿ quasi-
￿scal activities￿because they do not conform to traditional monetary policy, which is used to
stabilize in￿ ation by controlling the policy interest rate.2 Instead of being innate to central
banks, most of these activities can be implemented by ￿scal authorities. In this paper,
a quasi-￿scal policy is de￿ned as any policy action that a⁄ects the central banks￿balance
sheets, with the exception of the traditional monetary policy mentioned above. For example,
since credit easing operations alter the composition of the central banks￿asset accounts, they
are considered quasi-￿scal policies. If losses are incurred from the central banks￿assets and
the ￿scal authorities decide not to compensate the losses, then the ￿scal authorities￿decision
is also a quasi-￿scal policy because it decreases the central banks￿capital account.
Although current quasi-￿scal operations are signi￿cant in size and assumed to be crucial
for economic recovery, little economic theory is available to explain the possible macro-
economic consequences of these operations. Speci￿cally, the e⁄ect of quasi-￿scal policies
on in￿ ation needs to be explained because de￿ ation has been one of the main concerns of
policymakers during the implementation of such policies. This paper proposes a simple dy-
namic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model, which incorporates quasi-￿scal policies
in order to address the following questions: 1) Do quasi-￿scal policies and the central banks￿
balance sheets a⁄ect in￿ ation? and 2) Do the central banks￿balance sheets have implications
for policy interactions between the central banks and ￿scal authorities?
Sargent and Wallace (1981) and Leeper (1991) connected monetary and ￿scal policy
by showing that one policy may impose restrictions on the other policy, and that the two
policies should interact in a coherent way in order to deliver a unique equilibrium. In this
conventional approach to policy interaction, the budget constraints of the central banks and
￿scal authorities are consolidated into a single equation. In other words, conventional models
1For example, the Federal Reserve System￿ s asset account was $894 billion at the end of 2007, but
increased to $2,266 billion at the end of 2008.
2Mackenzie and Stella (1996) de￿ned a quasi-￿scal activity as ￿an operation or measure carried out by a
central bank ...with an e⁄ect that can, in principle, be duplicated by budgetary measures ...and that has
or may have an impact on the ￿nancial operations of the central bank￿(p. 17).
1implicitly assume that the ￿scal authorities acknowledge the central banks￿liabilities and
assets as their own liabilities and assets, and that the central banks￿losses are automatically
compensated by the ￿scal authorities. Due to these assumptions, in conventional models,
the budget constraint of the central banks does not impose restrictions on the equilibrium.
However, questions can be raised about this conventional assumption. Stella and L￿nnberg
(2008) surveyed 135 central banks and discovered that laws did not always guarantee the ￿s-
cal authorities￿responsibility for the central banks￿liabilities, and that the ￿scal authorities
are not always prompt in recapitalizing the central banks. Speci￿cally, Section 4 shows that
the Federal Reserve System may su⁄er negative net pro￿ts due to risky assets and that such
losses may not be fully covered by the treasury. In this regard, this paper relaxes the con-
ventional assumption by elaborating on the institutional details that state that the central
banks￿￿ ow budget constraint is separate from the ￿scal authorities￿￿ ow budget constraint.
In addition, this paper￿ s public sector model includes the ￿scal authorities￿transfer rule for
recapitalizing the central banks, and the transfer rule is the key quasi-￿scal policy in the
benchmark model.
Furthermore, this paper departs from conventional models by assuming that the real
values of the central banks￿and ￿scal authorities￿liabilities have ￿nite upper bounds, which
are the expected present values of their future earnings. Due to this assumption, the pe-
culiar equilibria, where the ￿scal authorities and central banks can run a Ponzi scheme on
each other and the real value of the central banks￿capital grows (or shrinks) in￿nitely, are
excluded from this paper. By utilizing this assumption and the institutional details of the
￿ ow budget constraints, we show that the intertemporal equilibrium condition from the
central banks￿budget constraint (the central banks￿net liability valuation formula) may
restrict equilibrium in￿ ation in a certain policy regime. In other words, the model in this
paper includes two intertemporal equilibrium conditions (from the public sector￿ s ￿ ow bud-
get constraints) and three policy instruments (monetary, ￿scal and quasi-￿scal), whereas one
intertemporal equilibrium condition and two policy instruments (monetary and ￿scal) exist
in the conventional model.
The main result of this paper shows that a new policy regime exists and that it delivers
a unique stationary equilibrium path. In this new policy regime, while quasi-￿scal policy
is active, monetary and ￿scal policies are ￿ passive￿ .3 The active quasi-￿scal policy means
that the ￿scal authorities do not stabilize the central banks￿real capital and do not increase
the fund transfer to the central banks when losses are incurred. In this case, the central
3Active and passive policies are de￿ned by Leeper (1991). That is, an active policy is not constrained by
the private agent￿ s optimization (thus equilibrium conditions), states of economy and other policies.
2banks￿net liability valuation formula restricts the equilibrium in￿ ation. Since the other
two policies are passively adjusted in order to satisfy the equilibrium conditions, in￿ ation is
uniquely determined by the central banks￿net liability valuation formula in this regime.
The economic mechanism underlying the active quasi-￿scal policy regime is the private
agent￿ s (household￿ s) portfolio adjustment between the central bank￿ s liability and consump-
tion. Suppose that an unanticipated shock occurs to the central bank￿ s earnings. Then,
households expect that the real value of the central bank￿ s net liability will deviate from the
expected present value of the central bank￿ s future earnings if the general price level does not
change. However, the portfolio adjustment between the central bank￿ s liability and the other
nominal asset (the ￿scal authority￿ s liability) cannot be utilized to restore the equilibrium
since the values of the two assets are synchronized by a common price, the general price
level. Therefore, households will try to adjust their portfolio between the central bank￿ s lia-
bility and consumption. This mechanism is the driving force behind in￿ ation (or de￿ ation)
induced by quasi-￿scal shocks in the active quasi-￿scal policy regime.
The benchmark model is extended by including explicit examples of quasi-￿scal policy,
such as a credit easing operation. In the ￿rst extension, the central bank holds long-term
government bonds during the implementation of the exit strategy. That is, in response
to economic recovery, the central bank may try to withdraw liquidity from the economy
by increasing the short-term interest rate. In the active quasi-￿scal policy regime, such
de￿ ationary policy shock induces in￿ ation via the devaluation of the central bank￿ s long-
term bond holdings when the central bank￿ s capital is negative.
The second extension analyzes issues of the credit easing operation by including the
central bank￿ s risky loan to the private agent in the model. The results show that the loss
incurred by the risky asset induces de￿ ation when the central bank￿ s capital is positive.
In sum, the quasi-￿scal shocks may induce unintended e⁄ects on in￿ ation. Therefore, if
policymakers are concerned about the perverse e⁄ects of quasi-￿scal shocks, then the ￿scal
authority and central bank should coordinate to stabilize the central bank￿ s capital in a
systematic way.
A few studies have been completed that shed light on the e⁄ects of concerns on the
central banks￿balance sheets. Jeanne and Svensson (2007) showed that if the central banks
su⁄er losses when their capital falls under a ￿xed level, then the central banks￿commitment
to escape from the liquidity trap is more credible. On the other hand, Sims (2003) showed
that the central banks￿balance sheet concerns might undermine the central banks￿abilities
to prevent in￿ ation. Berriel and Bhattarai (2009) showed that the optimal monetary policy
is signi￿cantly di⁄erent when the central bank￿ s budget constraint is separate from the ￿scal
3authorities￿budget constraint. Speci￿cally, as the central banks place higher e⁄ective weight
on in￿ ation in the loss function, the variation in in￿ ation decreases.
One of the di⁄erences between this paper and previous literature on the central banks￿
balance sheets is that a new type of equilibrium exists even if the policy interest rate does
not depend upon the status of the central banks￿balance sheets. For example, in Jeanne and
Svensson (2007) and Berriel and Bhattarai (2009), the central banks￿loss function includes
a deviation of the central banks￿real capital. In these cases, the central banks￿monetary
policy behavior may be restricted by the balance sheet concerns. However, the monetary
policy behavior in this paper follows a simple Taylor rule. In other words, the central bank,
in this paper, will not generate seigniorage in response to its balance sheet concerns.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we build the model
for the rational-expectations general equilibrium in exact nonlinear forms. In Section 3, the
equilibrium conditions are linearized around the deterministic steady state in order to derive
analytic solutions. In addition, we explain the equilibrium in the active quasi-￿scal policy
regime in this section. In Section 4, the plausibility of the active quasi-￿scal policy regime
is discussed by utilizing the actual balance sheet status of the Federal Reserve System. The
benchmark model is extended to include the exit strategy in Section 5 and issues in credit
easing operations are explored in Section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 The model
2.1 Private agent￿ s optimizing behavior
This model is a closed economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with
money in the utility function. Output is given by the exogenous endowment process fytg1
t=0
































; ct;Mt ￿ 0; 8t ￿ 0;
M￿1 + (1 + i￿1)B
A
￿1 > 0
where u(￿) is the utility function for consumption, v(￿) is the utility function for the real
money balance, ct is the single consumption goods, ￿t is the lump-sum tax, Mt is the nominal
4money balance, the agent holds BA
t units of the government￿ s risk-free one-period nominal
bonds, Pt is the price level, Et[￿] is the expectation based on the information available in
period t, it is the risk-free net nominal interest rate and the initial level of ￿nancial wealth
M￿1+(1+i￿1)BA























;Rt ￿ 1 + it;
where u0(￿) and v0(￿) refers to the ￿rst order derivative of u(￿) and v(￿), mt is the real money
balance (Mt=Pt), Xt;t+1 is the real pricing kernel (or the discount factor) between period t
and t+1 and Rt is the risk-free gross nominal interest rate. Equation (2) governs the money
demand of the agent and Equation (3) leads to the Fisher equation.
In order to ensure the existence of the agent￿ s unique optimal choice, the transversality
condition should be assumed. Speci￿cally, the agent cannot borrow a greater amount than











Et [Xt;T(yT ￿ ￿T)] > ￿1;8t; (4)
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optimal path, the ￿ ow and intertemporal budget constraint are satis￿ed by equality and it





T] = 0;8t: (5)
If the limit term in Equation (5) is strictly positive, then the agent accumulates an additional
￿nancial asset and it rolls over permanently. Obviously, this scenario is not optimal for the
agent because the agent sacri￿ces her consumption without any compensation. On the other
hand, if the limit term in Equation (5) is negative, then the agent is allowed to borrow
an additional unit of debt and roll it over permanently. This scenario is ruled out by the
No-Ponzi scheme assumption, which can be seen in Condition (4).
5The market clearing conditions are imposed for the general equilibrium. Speci￿cally, the
goods market, the nominal money and the government bonds market should be cleared as
follows:
ct = yt; (6)
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t is the nominal money supply, Bs
t is the government nominal bonds supply and
BC
t is the central bank￿ s demand for the government nominal bonds.4 Then, after imposing
market clearing conditions, the Euler equations turn into the following equilibrium conditions
























where f￿(￿) refers to the inverse function of v0(￿). Equation (9) states that the supply of the
real money balance should be equal to the agent￿ s real money demand and Equation (10)
is the Fisher equation. In order to completely de￿ne the rational-expectations general equi-
librium, the policy behavior of the ￿scal authority and the central bank should be speci￿ed.
Section 2.2 and 2.3 will explain the public sector model and the policy behavior.
2.2 Budgetary independence of central banks
This section introduces the budgetary independence of the central bank, which is a key
di⁄erence between this model and conventional models. While the policy independence of
the central bank refers to the central bank￿ s autonomy in deciding policy variables, such
as the policy interest rate, budgetary independence implies that the central bank￿ s ￿ ow
budget constraint and intertemporal equilibrium condition are separate from those of the
￿scal authority. That is, the concept of budgetary independence has two aspects. First, the
central bank￿ s balance sheet is isolated from the balance sheet of the ￿scal authority. Due
to this aspect, the ￿ ow budget constraint of the consolidated government in conventional
models is divided into two equations: one for the central bank and one for the ￿scal authority.
4Determination of BC
t will be explained in the next section.
6Second, a set of assumptions separates the uni￿ed intertemporal equilibrium condition (IEC)
from the consolidated government budget constraint into two IECs. One IEC is from the
central bank￿ s ￿ ow budget constraint and equilibrium conditions and the other is from the
￿scal authority￿ s budget constraint and equilibrium conditions.
The ￿rst aspect of budgetary independence elaborates on the institutional details of the
central bank￿ s balance sheet; therefore, the ￿rst aspect re￿ ects a fact. The second aspect
consists of assumptions on the agent￿ s expectations in regard to the public institutions￿
liabilities. This set of assumptions, which I will refer to as ￿ the budgetary independence
condition,￿is a crucial requirement for the results of this paper. That is, the budgetary
independence condition imposes an additional restriction on the equilibrium and is a main
deviation from conventional models. This section also provides arguments that the budgetary
independence condition is a valid requirement for the public sector model.
2.2.1 Separation of ￿ ow budget constraint
The ￿rst aspect of budgetary independence is explained using the balance sheets of the
public institutions. In Table 1, the simpli￿ed balance sheets of the public institutions and
the agent are illustrated as a benchmark case. Note that Table 1 omits the central bank￿ s
various accounts such as risky loans to the ￿nancial sector, which are accrued by quasi-
￿scal activities. Speci￿cally, the benchmark central bank only has monetary liability and
one-period risk-free government bonds as assets. The purpose of Table 1 is to show how
the balance sheets of public institutions are separated in the benchmark case. Based upon
these simple benchmark balance sheets, future extensions can accommodate accounts from
quasi-￿scal actions, such as liquidity provisions to the ￿nancial sector.
Table 1. Balance sheets of each entity5
Fiscal authority (A) Central bank (B) Public sector (A+B) Private agent
Asset Liability Asset Liability Asset Liability Asset Liability







Capital Capital Capital Capital
￿Bt BC
t ￿ Mt ￿(Mt + BA
t ) Mt + BA
t
5This balance sheet is e⁄ective at the end of the period t. If the balance sheet is measured at the beginning
of period t, the capital of the ￿scal authority is ￿Rt￿1Bt￿1, the central bank￿ s capital is Rt￿1BC
t￿1 ￿ Mt￿1
and the agent￿ s capital is Mt￿1 + Rt￿1BA
t￿1.
7According to Table 1, the ￿scal authority issues bonds and sells them to the agent (BA
t )
or to the central bank (BC
t ). Bt is the total ￿scal authority bonds outstanding, BC
t is the
central bank￿ s holdings of the ￿scal authority bonds and BA
t is the agent￿ s holdings of the
￿scal authority bonds. If the ￿scal authority￿ s capital account is negative, then the ￿scal
authority has had an accumulated ￿scal de￿cit, which was ￿nanced by debt issuance. The
central bank issues a nominal money balance (Mt) and accumulates the ￿scal authority￿ s
bond holdings (BC
t ) in return. Note that the central bank uses the ￿scal authority bond
holdings (BC
t ) as an instrument for open market operations. Speci￿cally, the central bank
sells (buys) ￿scal authority bonds when the central bank decreases (increases) the money
supply (Mt). The third column shows the consolidated public sector balance sheet, which is
a balance sheet of the consolidated government in conventional models. This conventional
balance sheet can be derived by adding the ￿scal authority￿ s balance sheet to the central
bank￿ s balance sheet.6 In the last column, the private agent￿ s balance sheet is a mirror image
of the consolidated public sector balance sheet.
Table 2. Changes in each balance sheet between the period t ￿ 1 and t.
Fiscal authority (A) Central bank (B)
Asset Liability Asset Liability





Pt(st ￿ ￿t) Pt￿t
￿it￿1Bt￿1 +it￿1BC
t￿1
Public sector (A+B) Private agent
Asset Liability Asset Liability











In order to derive ￿ ow budget constraints, the changes in the balance sheets are illustrated
in Table 2. Table 2 shows the income and expenditure of each entity during the period t
(￿ ow variables), whereas Table 1 is a snapshot of each entity￿ s ￿nancial status at the end
of period t (stock variables). The ￿scal surplus st is the lump-sum tax ￿t less the ￿scal
6BC
t is cancelled out when the two balance sheets are consolidated.
8authority expenditure in units of real goods,7 and ￿t refers to the transfer from the ￿scal
authority to the central bank in the real goods unit.8 According to Table 2, the ￿scal
authority receives nominal income from the lump-sum tax, then spends for the government
expenditure, transfer to the central bank and interest payments. The nominal income of the
central bank is the transfer from the ￿scal authority and interest earnings from the ￿scal
authority bonds holding. Finally, the agent receives nominal income (Ptyt + it￿1BA
t￿1), then
spends for consumption and pays the lump-sum tax.
Since ￿ ow budget constraints show possible changes in the balance sheets, the constraints
are derived by equating the changes in the asset account to the sum of the changes in the
liability and capital accounts. From the (A+B) column in Table 2, a consolidated government















Pt | {z }
￿Capital
: (11)
The central bank￿ s ￿ ow budget constraint is derived from the Figure 2 column (B) as in
Equation (12), while the ￿ ow budget constraint of the ￿scal authority as found in Equation






















Pt | {z }
￿Liability
+ st ￿ ￿t ￿
it￿1Bt￿1
Pt | {z }
￿Capital
; (13)
Note that Equation (11) is a sum of Equations (12) and (13). Since ￿t is the transfer term
between the two public institutions, it is cancelled out when the budget constraints are
consolidated into Equation (11). In addition, since the total ￿scal authority bonds Bt are
divided into the central bank￿ s holding BC
t and the agent￿ s holding BA
t (Bt = BC
t + BA
t ),
then only the agent￿ s holding BA
t remains in the consolidated budget constraint.
7The government spending is assumed to be zero for all time periods. No result relies on this assumption.
8Central banks generally submit their net pro￿ts to ￿scal authorities. In this case, ￿t is a negative number.
92.2.2 Separation of intertemporal equilibrium condition
For the second aspect of the central bank￿ s budgetary independence, an extra set of conditions
is assumed for the agent￿ s expectations in regard to the two public institutions￿relationship.
This set of conditions, which is shown in Conditions (15) and (16), is required in order
to separate the uni￿ed IEC from the consolidated government budget constraint into two
IECs. In the conventional models, such as are found in Woodford (2001), the uni￿ed IEC
















The uni￿ed IEC (14) can be derived by solving forward the consolidated government budget
constraint (11), while the equilibrium conditions including the agent￿ s transversality condi-
tion (5) are substituted into the constraint.
The Proposition 1 states that the uni￿ed IEC is separated into two IECs when the agent
expects that the central bank and the ￿scal authority have bounded real values for their
liabilities.
Proposition 1 Suppose the Conditions (15) and (16) are true,
￿ ￿wA
t
￿ ￿ < 19 and Pt, Xt;T > 0





























Et [Xt;T(sT ￿ ￿T)] < 1; (16)
then the uni￿ed IEC (14) is separated into two IECs.
Proof. Note that d
C(F)
t refers to the real net liability of the central bank (the ￿scal
authority) at period t and wA
t = dC
t + dF
t . Intuitively, the Conditions (15) and (16) mean
that the real values of the central bank and the ￿scal authority liabilities cannot be greater
9Arguably, the real value of government liability (wA
t ) is bounded. One can imagine equilibria where the
lump-sum tax to output ratio is unbounded. In these equilibria, it may be possible that the government
liability to output ratio as well as the lump-sum tax to output ratio are explosive, while the tax to debt ratio
remains ￿nite. Canzoneri et al.￿ s (2001) results showed the Ricardian equivalence under these equilibria.
However, if a distortionary tax is introduced, then the scenario is not feasible. This paper excludes these
bizarre equilibria by assumption.
10than the expected present value of the future earnings. Appendix A shows that the following


















= 0;8t;T > t: (18)
Then, the ￿ ow budget constraints (12) and (13) are turned into the following IECs by
























Et [Xt;T(sT ￿ ￿T)]: (20)
Note that Equation (14) is a sum of Equations (19) and (20).
I refer to the IEC (19) as ￿ the central bank￿ s net liability valuation formula￿because
Equation (19) indicates that the real value of the central bank￿ s net liability is equal to the






PT ]) and the transfer earnings
from (or payment to) the ￿scal authority (
P1
T=t Et[Xt;T￿T]).10 The IEC (20) states that
the real value of the ￿scal authority￿ s total liability is supported by the current and future
￿scal surplus less the transfer to the central bank. It should also be noted that Equations
(19) and (20) are not constraints, but are equilibrium conditions from the Euler equations,
the agent￿ s optimal conditions, the agent￿ s expectations on the policy institutions and ￿ ow
budget constraints.
Remark 1 The crux of assumptions (15) and (16) is that the expected present value of the
transfers between the two institutions is ￿nite.
In this model, the present values of the seigniorage and ￿scal surplus converge to ￿nite
values. The convergence of the present value of the seigniorage revenue can be shown by the
10In order to ensure Pt > 0, it is further assumed that the expected present values of the seigniorage, the
￿scal surplus and the transfer are consistent with the positive price level. For example, in Equation (19),
the positive central bank capital (Mt￿1 ￿ Rt￿1BC
t￿1 < 0) implies that the expected present value of future
transfer from the central bank to the ￿scal authority is greater than the seigniorage revenue.


















Et [Xt;T (yT ￿ ￿T)]: (21)
The right side of Inequality (21) is positive and bounded, which is implied by the agent￿ s
No-Ponzi scheme assumption (4) and the assumption
￿ ￿wA
t
￿ ￿ < 1. Since both consumption
and the real balance holding are positive, then the present value of the seigniorage is ￿nite
in any equilibrium. The present value of the ￿scal surplus (
P1
T=t Et[Xt;TsT]) should be also
￿nite in the IEC (14). Since the terms other than the present value of transfer are all ￿nite
in (15) and (16), the validity of assumptions (15) and (16) hinges on the convergence of the
expected present value of the transfers.
A su¢ cient condition for the convergence of the transfer in the deterministic case is
presented in Condition (22). Using the ratio test for the convergence of the in￿nite series,
we get
limsup
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿XT;T+1
￿T+1
￿T
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ < 1; j￿Tj < 1: (22)
Condition (22) means that the transfer may grow faster than the real interest rate for only
a ￿nite number of time periods. If the transfer grows faster than the real rate for an in￿nite
number of time periods, then the real values of the public institutions￿liabilities will grow
(or shrink) inde￿nitely by the ￿ ow budget constraints. In this case, the exploding transfer
should ultimately be ￿nanced by the exploding BC since the convergence of the seigniorage
and surplus implies that the asymptotic growth rates of the seigniorage and surplus will fall
below the real interest rate. The conventional models, without the budgetary independence
of the central banks, have not excluded this peculiar scenario. In this perspective, the
additional set of assumptions (15) and (16) is a lax requirement for the public sector model
because the exploding liabilities scenario is hardly imaginable. Indeed, it is observed that
restrictions (15) and (16) have been in e⁄ect, and that the restrictions become more plausible
with the recent trend of the central banks￿policy independence.11 These two rationales are
elaborated as follows.
First, the value of the transfers between the governments and central banks (or banknote
issuing commercial banks) have been limited in the history of central banking. In the early
stage of the central banks￿evolution, they were bestowed a charter to issue monetary liability
11Sims (2003) claimed that among two types of central banks, type E banks are more probable to have
the budgetary independence than type F banks. However, since the given arguments are well applicable to
type F banks, this paper claims that the budgetary independence is universal to the central banks.
12in return for ￿nancial favors to the governments. Although the early central banks provided
￿nancial services to the governments, the governments usually did not support the early
central banks when they were in distress. This feature was revealed by the public￿ s distrust of
banknotes in the face of ￿nancial crises (Goodhart, 1988, p. 19-20). For example, the failure
of the John Law￿ s Banque Royale in France (1720) and the suspension of gold convertibility
in England (1797-1819) showed that governments have refused (or been unable) to support
the values of the central banks￿liabilities. If the governments￿transfers to the central banks
have in￿nite present values, then the government should have injected gold (or silver) into
the central banks￿vaults in order to ensure the convertibility of the banknotes. However, the
exact opposite scenario has occurred in history. That is, the governments often suspended
convertibility during times of ￿scal need. Also, during some occasions, such as during the
￿rst world war in Germany, the central banks transferred funds to the governments on a
large scale, but such operations came to an end with the occurrence of hyperin￿ ation and
regime changes.
Second, as more emphasis is placed on the central banks￿policy independence, the bud-
getary independence assumptions (15) and (16) (or equivalently, (17) and (18)) have become
more plausible. That is, Sims (2003) claimed that a trend has occurred to prohibit the com-
pulsory accumulation of the ￿scal authority debts by the independent central bank, and that
the transactions between the ￿scal authority and the independent central bank should be
mere by-products of monetary policy. The intuition on conditions (17) and (18) conforms to
the above statements. Speci￿cally, (17) and (18) imply that neither the central bank nor the
￿scal authority can run a Ponzi scheme on the other entity. The Ponzi scheme scenario is ob-
viously unacceptable to the central banks which have policy independence where acquisition
of government debts only occur for monetary policy purposes. In other words, the policy
independent central bank is expected to reject extreme paths of transfer which violate the
condition (22) and the budgetary independence requirement. In sum, the budgetary inde-
pendence is ubiquitous for the central banks and a sensible assumption because the concept
is well applicable to both the early central banks as well as to the modern central banks
which have policy independence.
2.3 Policy behavior
Although Equations (19) and (20) are equilibrium conditions, various policy mixtures can
deliver the equilibrium price level Pt. In conventional literature, generally, monetary policy
determines the path of the policy interest rate, while ￿scal policy decides the path of the ￿scal
13surplus fstg. A description of monetary and ￿scal policy behavior is su¢ cient for determining
a unique equilibrium price level in conventional literature because the two terms su¢ ciently
characterize the policy behaviors in (14). However, in this paper, another policy rule must
also be established in order to determine the equilibrium as there is an additional unspeci￿ed
policy variable f￿tg. This section proposes a rule for the ￿scal authority￿ s transfer to the
central bank f￿tg. The rule is referred to as quasi-￿scal policy in the benchmark model.
2.3.1 Clari￿cation on quasi-￿scal policy
Before the policy rules can be speci￿ed, we must clarify the concept of quasi-￿scal policy,
both in general and in particular for this model. The term quasi-￿scal policy covers a wide
range of policy behaviors. As it is already de￿ned in the introduction, quasi-￿scal policy
refers to any action, except monetary policy, that a⁄ects the central bank￿ s balance sheet.
Additional clari￿cations can be made with respect to the following questions: 1) Which
public institution decides quasi-￿scal policy?, 2) What are the policy instruments? and 3)
Why does this model focus on the transfer between the two institutions as a representative
of quasi-￿scal policy?
In regard to the authority in charge of quasi-￿scal policy, both the ￿scal authority and
the central bank may, in general, decide quasi-￿scal policy. For example, if the central bank
decides to provide liquidity to the ￿nancial sector, the policy may be the central bank￿ s
decision. However, as it has already been noted, the transfer from the ￿scal authority to the
central bank is also quasi-￿scal policy. If the ￿scal authority decides not to transfer funds
to the central bank, then the ￿scal authority determines the quasi-￿scal policy in this case.
Policy instruments can also vary based on speci￿c cases. In order to provide liquidity to
the ￿nancial sector, the central bank can purchase risky assets from the ￿nancial sector. In
this case, quasi-￿scal policy is implemented by adjusting the central bank￿ s asset account.
The sterilized foreign exchange rate intervention is another example in which the central
bank￿ s asset account (foreign reserve) is the policy instrument. When a quasi-￿scal activity
is aimed at recapitalizing the central bank, the transfer rule from the ￿scal authority to the
central bank can be used as an instrument.
The benchmark model of this paper excludes all other quasi-￿scal policies and focuses
only on the transfer from the ￿scal authority to the central bank. This modeling choice is
related to the notion of policies￿activeness. Leeper (1991) stated that active policy is not
constrained by the state of the economy. Speci￿cally, in Leeper (1991), ￿scal policy is active
when the ￿scal authority pays little attention to the level of the real value of government
debt when it determines the ￿scal policy instrument, the lump-sum tax. In other words,
14the level of government debt is one of the states of the economy in conventional models. In
this paper, the state of the economy includes the level of government debt as well as the
central bank￿ s capital, which is obvious from the IEC (19) and (20). Then, the modeling
choice is to determine which particular quasi-￿scal policy is most appropriate with which to
target the central bank￿ s capital. Targeting the central bank￿ s capital means that the ￿scal
authority uses the quasi-￿scal policy instrument in order to maintain a certain level of the
central bank￿ s capital. Therefore, if the ￿scal authority does not target the central bank￿ s
capital, then the quasi-￿scal policy is active.
One of the most direct ways to target the central bank￿ s capital is to transfer funds from
the ￿scal authority to the central bank because the central banks do not impose direct taxes
to the agent in general. Therefore, an appropriate way to model the central bank￿ s capital
targeting behavior is the transfer rule. This rule can be used because the other quasi-￿scal
policy actions, such as the liquidity provision, have other cardinal policy motivations. For
instance, a key motivation of the liquidity provision is to stabilize the ￿nancial sector, and it
is not generally used for adjusting the central bank￿ s capital level. Although the benchmark
model does not include various quasi-￿scal policies, the framework will be extended to include
explicit examples of quasi-￿scal policies in Section 5 and 6.
2.3.2 Policy rules
Linear policy rules are introduced in order to specify the policy behaviors. First, monetary
policy follows the simple Taylor rule. That is, the central bank sets the risk-free gross interest
rate (policy interest rate) in response to contemporary in￿ ation as follows:
Rt = ￿0 + ￿￿t + ￿t; (23)
￿t = ￿￿￿t￿1 + "￿t; (0 ￿ ￿￿ < 1)
where ￿0 and ￿ are policy parameters, ￿t refers to the monetary policy shock which follows
the AR(1) process and "￿t is white noise. Note that the central bank does not adjust the
policy interest rate in response to its capital level. In other words, the model central bank
does not try to target its capital by printing money.
Second, the ￿scal authority determines the transfer to the central bank (￿t) by following
the next rule.







￿t = ￿￿￿t￿1 + "￿t; (0 ￿ ￿￿ < 1)
15where ￿0 and ￿Q are policy parameters, ￿t is the AR(1) random policy shock, bC
t￿1 ￿mt￿1(￿
BC
t￿1=Pt￿1 ￿Mt￿1=Pt￿1) is the real capital of the central bank, cap is the central bank￿ s real
capital target and "￿t is white noise. The quasi-￿scal policy rule (24) states that the transfer
between the central bank and the ￿scal authority may or may not be responsive to the level
of the central bank￿ s real capital. When the central bank￿ s real capital falls below the target
level (cap), the ￿scal authority￿ s transfer to the central bank increases if the parameter ￿Q
is strictly positive. If the parameter ￿Q is zero, then the ￿scal authority does not adjust
its transfer to the central bank in response to the level of the central bank￿ s capital. The
quasi-￿scal policy shock ￿t is the random part of the transfer.
Finally, the ￿scal authority determines ￿scal surplus st by the rule (25). Given this rule,
the ￿scal surplus may or may not be constrained by the level of the ￿scal authority￿ s debt.
st = ￿0 + ￿Fb
A
t￿1 +  t; (25)
 t = ￿  t￿1 + " t; (0 ￿ ￿  < 1)
where ￿0 and ￿F are the policy parameters, bA
t is the real value of the ￿scal authority￿ s debt
which is held by the agent (BA
t =Pt),  t is an AR(1) ￿scal policy shock and " t is white noise.
2.4 Equilibrium
The rational-expectations general equilibrium is de￿ned as the sequence of price {Pt}, the se-





The sequences satisfy equilibrium conditions ((9) and (10)), the market clearing conditions
((6), (7) and (8)), the public sector budget constraints ((12) and (13)) and the policy rules
((23), (24) and (25)), given the exogenous processes {yt,￿t,￿t, t}. In addition, the optimal
condition (5) and the budgetary independence condition ((17) and (18)) are satis￿ed in the
equilibrium.
This paper focuses on the equilibrium in which the central bank￿ s net liability valuation
formula (19) uniquely determines the price level. Similar to Cochrane (2001)￿ s characteriza-
tion of the ￿scal theory of the price level, the price level is determined by the ratio of the
central bank￿ s net liability to the present value of the central bank￿ s future earnings in such
equilibrium. The complete characterization of the policy regime in which such equilibrium
realizes will be explored in Section 3 within the context of linearized system.
163 Linearized system
In this section, the equilibrium conditions are linearized around the deterministic steady
state while the equilibrium conditions are expressed in exact nonlinear forms in Section 2.
Speci￿cally, this section￿ s analysis is restricted to the equilibria with the bounded in￿ ation
rate and real values of bonds (bA
t and bC
t ).12 In addition, this section assumes the log utility
function and a constant output for simplicity.






; yt = y;8t; (26)
where ￿ is a parameter for the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and the
real money balance. In this simple case, the equilibrium conditions from the private agent￿ s















where the in￿ ation rate ￿t+1 ￿ Pt+1=Pt. Another notable simpli￿cation from the log-utility














= ￿; 8t: (30)
3.1 Policy interactions
The linear dynamic system is derived from the equilibrium conditions of the private agent￿ s
optimization ((27) and (28)), the policy rules ((23), (24) and (25)) and the public sector￿ s
￿ ow budget constraints ((12) and (13)), after they have been linearized. In order to apply
Sims￿(2001) algorithm, the system is summarized in a matrix form as follows.
￿0xt+1 = ￿1xt + ￿0zt+1 + ￿1zt + ￿t+1; (31)
12If we restrict the analysis to the equilibria with the bounded in￿ ation, then the real values of bonds (bA
t
and bC
t ) should also be bounded due to the assumptions of Proposition 1.
17where the vector of the endogenous variables is xt ￿ (^ ￿t;^ bC
t ;^ bA
t )0, the vector of the exogenous
shocks is zt ￿ (^ ￿t;^ ￿t; ^  t)0, the forecast error vector is ￿t+1 ￿ (￿t+1;0;0)0, ￿t+1 ￿ ￿t+1 ￿
Et[￿t+1], ￿ and ￿ are 3 ￿ 3 parameter matrices, and the ^ notation is used for the linear
deviation from the deterministic steady state.
Proposition 2 Three regions of policy parameter space (regimes) deliver a unique stationary
solution of the system (31).
Proof. In order to uniquely determine the system￿ s (31) solution, only one of eigenvalues
of the transition matrix ￿
￿1
0 ￿1 should be greater than one in the absolute value because only





That is, the existence and uniqueness of the solution depends upon the policy parameters
(￿;￿Q and ￿F) and the deep behavioral parameter (￿). In addition, each policy parameter
has one associated eigenvalue within the system. If an active policy is de￿ned as the policy
for which the associated eigenvalue is unstable, then it is obvious that only one of the three
policies should be active in order for the system to have a unique solution. The three policy
regimes that determine a unique stationary equilibrium path are as follows.
AMP regime: j￿￿j > 1;
￿ ￿￿
￿1 ￿ ￿Q
￿ ￿ < 1;
￿ ￿￿
￿1 ￿ ￿F
￿ ￿ < 1;
AQFP regime: j￿￿j < 1;
￿ ￿￿
￿1 ￿ ￿Q
￿ ￿ > 1;
￿ ￿￿
￿1 ￿ ￿F
￿ ￿ < 1;
AFP regime: j￿￿j < 1;
￿ ￿￿
￿1 ￿ ￿Q
￿ ￿ < 1;
￿ ￿￿
￿1 ￿ ￿F
￿ ￿ > 1:
The active monetary policy (AMP) and active ￿scal policy (AFP) regimes are well-known
policy regimes. In the AMP regime, the monetary policy actively sets the policy interest rate
in order to stabilize in￿ ation, while passive ￿scal policy supports the real value of the ￿scal
authority￿ s liability. In the AFP regime, the expected path of the ￿scal surplus determines
in￿ ation, while the monetary policy passively accommodates the determined in￿ ation path
by adjusting the nominal money balance. A novel ￿nding of this paper is the equilibrium
in the active quasi-￿scal policy (AQFP) regime and the requirements for the passive quasi-
￿scal policy when other policies are active. In the AQFP regime, the active quasi-￿scal
policy determines in￿ ation and other policies are passive in the same way as in the other
13The detailed derivation of the solution is described in Appendix B.
18regimes. When the quasi-￿scal policy is passive, then it tries to support the real value of the
public sector liability.
A brief intuition of this policy interaction can be found in the following equilibrium
conditions.






















T￿t (^ sT ￿ ^ ￿T)
￿
; (34)
where (32) is the linearized Fisher equation after substituting the monetary policy rule and
m, R, bC, bA and ￿ are the steady state values. Equations (33) and (34) are simpli￿cations
of the IECs (19) and (20) using Equations (29) and (30).14
First, if monetary policy is active (j￿￿j > 1), then the expectational di⁄erence equation
(32) can be utilized to determine ￿t. In this case, for the existence and uniqueness of the
solution, the transfer f￿Tg should support the real value of the central bank￿ s liability (left
side of IEC (33)) by being endogenously determined through the IEC (33). Meanwhile, the
￿scal surplus fsTg should be passively adjusted in order to support the real value of the
￿scal authority￿ s liability in the IEC (34).
Second, active quasi-￿scal policy (
￿ ￿￿
￿1 ￿ ￿Q
￿ ￿ > 1) implies that the transfer f￿Tg is
not responsive to the state of the central bank￿ s capital. Then, f￿Tg can be regarded as an
exogenous process in the IEC (33). Therefore, the IEC (33) imposes a restriction on in￿ ation
since all variables other than in￿ ation are predetermined or exogenous. The passive monetary
policy in Equation (32) (j￿￿j < 1) means that the expectational di⁄erence equation (32) does
not restrict in￿ ation ￿t. Again, the passive ￿scal policy supports the real value of the ￿scal
authority￿ s liability so that the IEC (34) does not bind in￿ ation.
Third, when the ￿scal policy is active, the monetary and quasi-￿scal policies should be
passive. Speci￿cally, Equation (32) should not impose an additional restriction on in￿ ation
and the transfer f￿Tg should be passive in a way that it is endogenously determined by the
IECs (33) and (34), simultaneously. Since the endogenous process f￿Tg appears in both the
IECs, the two IECs jointly determine in￿ ation. In other words, the uni￿ed IEC (14) is the
single equation to be imposed on the in￿ ation process. Note that this equilibrium is the
same as in the ￿scal theory of the price level.
14The IECs (33) and (34) are derived by linearizing the IECs (19) and (20) around the steady state by
assuming that the economy was in the steady state at period t ￿ 1.
19Another notable feature of the policy interaction is that passive monetary policy does not
need to raise the seigniorage revenue in order to cover the decreased transfer from the ￿scal
authority or the decreased ￿scal authority surplus. The real seigniorage revenue is even a
￿xed number (￿y) for all of the periods in this model. Even if the seigniorage is a function
of the nominal interest rate under general circumstances, it is still the case that the nominal
interest rate is not responsive to in￿ ation when monetary policy is passive. Therefore, in this
case, the present value of the seigniorage in the IEC (33) can be treated as a ￿xed number.
In sum, it is a misleading statement that passive monetary policy raises the seigniorage in
order to balance the intertemporal budgets. Instead, the passive central bank adjusts the
nominal money balance in order to accommodate the real money market clearing condition
(9) in accordance with the equilibrium price level, which is determined elsewhere.
3.2 Equilibrium in the active quasi-￿scal policy regime
As it is discussed in Proposition 2, if the quasi-￿scal policy is active while the monetary and
￿scal policies are passive, then a unique stationary equilibrium in￿ ation path exists. The
nature of this equilibrium is di⁄erent from that of AMP and AFP regimes as the quasi-￿scal
policy shock a⁄ects surprise in￿ ation and the direction of the e⁄ect depends upon the steady
state value of the central bank￿ s capital.15 For a simple illustration, the following special
case is considered:
￿;￿Q;￿￿;￿￿;￿  = 0;
￿ ￿￿
￿1 ￿ ￿F
￿ ￿ < 1: (35)
The central bank pegs the policy interest rate (￿ = 0), the ￿scal authority￿ s transfer to the
central bank is not responsive to the level of the central bank￿ s capital (￿Q = 0), the policy
shocks are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) and the ￿scal authority su¢ ciently
adjusts the lump-sum tax in response to the level of its own debt held by the agent. In this






where R is the steady state value of the gross interest rate, bC is the steady state real value
of the central bank￿ s holding of the ￿scal authority bonds, m is the steady state value of the
real money balance and RbC ￿m is the steady state value of the central bank￿ s real capital.
In￿ ation is the sum of the expected in￿ ation and surprise in￿ ation. Since the surprise
15Equilibria in AMP and AFP regimes are fundamentally the same as in conventional models, such as in
Leeper (1991). Thus, those equilibria are not discussed in this paper.
20in￿ ation was solved in Equation (36), then in￿ ation is determined as follows in the AQFP
regime.




Note that ￿"￿t￿1 is the expected in￿ ation Et￿1[^ ￿t] in this case.16 The solution in Equation
(37) implies that the contractionary monetary policy shock (positive "￿t￿1) increases in￿ ation
in the next period via the expected in￿ ation. The result is consistent with the simple ￿scal
theory of the price level (Leeper, 1991) and the ￿ Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic￿(Sargent
and Wallace, 1981).
Figure 1. Analogy diagram


















Private agent Private agent
The economic mechanism through which quasi-￿scal policy shocks a⁄ect in￿ ation is ex-
plained using an analogy between this model and a private ￿rm￿ s asset pricing case. In
Figure 1￿ s Analogue case (A), the private agent holds liabilities from Firm C and Firm F.
A cash ￿ ow contract also exists between the ￿rms and, in return of the contract, one ￿rm
holds the liability of the other ￿rm. Suppose that the cash ￿ ow from Firm F to Firm C
unexpectedly decreases. Then, the agent will try to adjust her portfolio by selling Firm C￿ s
liability and buying Firm F￿ s liability since the shock is favorable to Firm F￿ s value. The
portfolio adjustment will continue until the real value of each ￿rm￿ s liability becomes equal
to the present value of each ￿rm￿ s earnings. In the end, the relative price of Firm C￿ s liability
with respect to the price of Firm F￿ s liability will fall.
The structure and procedure are similar in Figure 1￿ s Public Sector case (B). The private
agent holds the liabilities from the central bank (M) and the ￿scal authority (BA), while
an expected path of the cash transfer exists between the two public institutions (￿) and the
central bank holds the ￿scal authority￿ s liability (BC). Suppose that a similar shock exists
as in the analogy case. That is, a negative quasi-￿scal policy shock decreases the transfer
from the ￿scal authority to the central bank unexpectedly. Then, a portfolio adjustment
16This point can be shown by setting ￿ = 0 in Equation (32).
21will occur on the part of the private agent. However, fundamental di⁄erences exist between
the Public Sector and Analogue cases that make the Public Sector case special. That is, the
public sector model determines in￿ ation, not asset prices.
A crucial di⁄erence between the cases is that the relative price of the central bank￿ s liabil-
ity with respect to the ￿scal authority￿ s risk-free liability is ￿xed to one in the Public Sector
case, while the prices of Firm C￿ s and Firm F￿ s liabilities are determined independently.
That is, it is obvious from the representative agent￿ s budget constraint (1) that one unit of
BA
t is guaranteed to be exchanged for one unit of Mt. Since the values of the nominal money
and government debts are synchronized,17 it is useless to adjust the portfolio by exchanging
Mt for BA
t when a quasi-￿scal shock exists. Instead of exchanging Mt with BA
t , the agent has
the option to choose consumption. When the agent feels that the the central bank￿ s liability
has changed, then she may try to adjust her consumption. This portfolio adjustment on the
part of the agent is the driving force behind in￿ ation in the active quasi-￿scal policy regime.
Another key characteristic of the portfolio adjustment is that the central bank￿ s capital
account (Rt￿1BC
t￿1￿Mt￿1) matters for the agent￿ s portfolio determination. This feature also
stems from the fact that the values of M, BA and BC are synchronized in the public sector
model. On the other hand, the agent would not be concerned with how much of Firm F￿ s
liability is held by Firm C when she assesses the impact of the shock on Firm C￿ s value. The
negative shock, which decreases the cash ￿ ow to Firm C, is always unfavorable to Firm C￿ s
value. Although Firm C￿ s asset value (the value of Firm F￿ s liability within Firm C￿ s asset
account) re￿ ects the impact of the shock, the impact is exogenous to the agent￿ s decision on
Firm C￿ s liability because the asset value is determined independently by the asset pricing
equation for Firm F￿ s liability.
In the public sector model, however, the impact of a similar shock on the central bank￿ s
value via the value of BC cannot be exogenous to the agent￿ s decision on the central bank￿ s
liability. As the price of BC is synchronized with the price of M, the portfolio adjustment for
M will also a⁄ect the value of BC through the common price 1=Pt. Therefore, the agent takes
the magnitude of both M and BC into account when she reacts to the shock. Speci￿cally,
the negative quasi-￿scal shock is unfavorable to the value of M, but favorable to the value
of BC. Thus, in an overall assessment, the negative quasi-￿scal shock is favorable to the
central bank￿ s liability when the central bank has positive capital (Rt￿1BC
t￿1 ￿ Mt￿1 > 0).
Due to the special features of the public sector model, a surprise de￿ ation (in￿ ation)
exists in response to the negative quasi-￿scal policy shock when the central bank￿ s capital is
positive (negative), RBC ￿ M > 0 (RBC ￿ M < 0). This statement can be veri￿ed by the
17The common price of Mt, BA
t and BC
t in units of consumption goods is 1=Pt.
22analytic solution to the system, which is found in Equation (36). When the transfer from
the ￿scal authority to the central bank surprisingly decreases, the central bank￿ s liability
(M) becomes more attractive to the agent, as discussed previously. Then, the agent tries
to increase the nominal money holding by decreasing consumption. Since output is ￿xed in
this endowment economy, the fall in demand causes de￿ ation. Meanwhile, the future lump-
sum tax is expected to be passively adjusted in order to support the real value of the ￿scal
authority￿ s liability, so that the valuation formula for the ￿scal authority￿ s liability (20) does
not restrict the equilibrium in￿ ation.
A mechanical explanation as to what procedure the quasi-￿scal shock induces in the
AQFP regime is given as follows. The ￿rst step is the public sector￿ s response to the quasi-
￿scal shock. Suppose that the policy interest rate is pegged, no policy shocks exist other than
the i.i.d. quasi-￿scal shock during the current period, the lump-sum tax and the transfer are
initially expected to remain at the steady state level, and the path of the price level is given
parametrically to public institutions. For algebraic simplicity, the steady state in￿ ation is
assumed to be zero (Pt = P;8t). Then, by the money market equilibrium condition (27),
the nominal money balance is ￿xed at the steady state level for all time periods. Also, the

















where R refers to the policy interest rate, which is pegged at the steady state level. Equations
(38) and (39) are derived by simplifying the ￿ ow budget constraints of the public institutions.
Suppose further that the transfer ￿t surprisingly decreases by one consumption good unit
and that the price level is normalized to unity. Then, BC
t also must be decreased by one
consumption good unit. That is, the central bank sells one unit of the ￿scal authority￿ s debts
at the bonds market and submits the received cash to the ￿scal authority. In response to
this shock, since the future transfers are expected to remain at the steady state level, it is
expected that the central bank￿ s holding of the ￿scal authority￿ s debt will fall below of the










where BC is the steady state level of the central bank￿ s holding of the ￿scal authority￿ s
































￿ 1 = ￿1: (42)
The second step of the procedure is the agent￿ s reaction to the violation of the budgetary
independence condition. The intuition of Equations (41) and (42) is that the ￿scal authority
takes the central bank￿ s real capital in one unit of real goods and does not eventually repay
it. If the sales department takes the producing department￿ s resource within the same ￿rm,
then the news would not a⁄ect the price of the ￿rm￿ s stock. However, if Firm F takes Firm
C￿ s real capital, then the stock prices of the two ￿rms will be adjusted through the agent￿ s
portfolio adjustments. In the public sector model, the central bank and ￿scal authority are
two distinct institutions, as they have distinct liabilities and the present value of the transfer
between the institutions is ￿nite. Thus, the violation of conditions ((17) and (18)) induces
the agent￿ s portfolio adjustment and the general price level Pt can no longer be ￿xed. That
is, through the portfolio adjustment, the price level is changed up to the point that the
conditions ((17) and (18)) are restored. Then, the future lump-sum tax will be changed
according to the ￿scal policy rule.
Two more important features of the equilibrium exist. First, the model￿ s economic mech-
anism for in￿ ation does not rely on the central bank￿ s money creation in response to the
transfer to the government. In the ￿rst step of the procedure, the central bank ￿xed the
nominal money balance, but in￿ ation (de￿ ation) is still induced by the quasi-￿scal shock. A
similar statement can be made for the ￿scal theory of the price level. In the active ￿scal pol-
icy regime, the tax shock does not require the creation of money in order to have an impact
on the price level. Otherwise, the tax shock induces the agent￿ s portfolio adjustment, and,
thus, the price changes. Therefore, this model￿ s application is never restricted to extreme
situations, such as a large scale transfer between two public institutions.
Second, the equilibrium in the AQFP regime is observationally equivalent to the equilibria
in the AMP and AFP regimes. Suppose that a quasi-￿scal policy shock causes in￿ ation
in the AQFP regime. Then, the nominal money balance must be increased passively in
order to clear the money market equilibrium condition (27) and the future ￿scal surplus
must be passively decreased in accordance with the price change by the ￿scal policy rule
(25). The required tax change in the present value can be shown by adding (19) to (20).
This observational relationship between in￿ ation, the nominal money balance and the ￿scal
surplus is the same as in the other regimes, although the causal relationships are opposite.
For instance, in the AMP regime, an expansion of the nominal money balance (a negative
24monetary policy shock) causes in￿ ation and the ￿scal surplus is passively decreased. In
the AFP regime, the decrease in the ￿scal surplus causes in￿ ation and the nominal money
balance is passively increased.
4 Discussion: Plausibility of the AQFP regime
The active quasi-￿scal policy regime becomes more plausible in major economies as the
major central banks, such as the Federal Reserve System, are more involved in quasi-￿scal
activities. The crucial rationale for the activeness of quasi-￿scal policy in the U.S. is the fact
that the treasury does not guarantee full automatic compensation for losses incurred from
the quasi-￿scal activities of the Federal Reserve System. Suppose that the Federal Reserve
System su⁄ers losses from risky assets and the treasury does not automatically transfer funds
to the system￿ s capital account. Then, the transfer rule (24) implies that ￿Q is su¢ ciently
small and the quasi-￿scal policy is arguably active.
The argument stems from the institutional feature that the funds transfer ￿t is asymmet-
ric between the cases where the Federal Reserve System has positive and negative pro￿ts. As
is usual for the central banks, the Federal Reserve System remits the positive net pro￿t to
the treasury on a regular basis, while maintaining a certain level of capital. This institutional
feature may mislead the readers to argue that quasi-￿scal policy should always be passive.
However, in a contradictory case where the Federal Reserve System has a negative net pro￿t,
the remittance from the treasury to the Federal Reserve System is not guaranteed.18 Instead,
the system will suspend its transfer to the treasury until the system has a positive pro￿t.19
This case matches with the policy parameter ￿Q = 0 in which the quasi-￿scal policy is active.
The Joint Statement by the Department of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve in March
2009 broadly stated that ￿scal policy should be responsible for the credit program and the
system should avoid risks from policy operations. However, it is still true that the statement
is silent about the treasury￿ s practical responsibility in regard to the system￿ s losses.
18Actually, the asymmetry in the disposal of the central banks￿losses is ubiquitous around the world
(Stella and L￿nnberg, 2008).
19This strategy is stated on the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System￿ s website under the
title ￿ Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet￿ .
25Table 3. Consolidated balance sheet of the Federal Reserve System (in billion dollars)
Asset20 9/30/09 12/27/06 Liability 9/30/09 12/27/06
Securities 1,593 779 Federal Reserve notes 874 783
Short term lending 264 0 Reserve Balances 848 13
Targeted lending 84 0 Treasury deposits 273 4
Emergency lending 101 0 Others 98 44
Others 102 96 Total 2,093 844
Total 2,144 875 Capital 51 31
Data source: Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.4.1 and Bernanke (2009c)
The following numerical example illustrates a speci￿c case in which the quasi-￿scal policy
becomes active. Table 3 shows the actual balance sheets of the Federal Reserve System before
and after the ￿nancial turmoil in 2008. Notably, the Federal Reserve System funded various
lending programs by increasing the reserve balances. While the magnitude of the security
holdings increased, its maturity composition also changed signi￿cantly. That is, only 48% of
the total securities ($372 billion) had a long-term remaining maturity (longer than 1 year)
in 2006, whereas 93% of the total securities ($1,477 billion) were long-term bonds in 2009.
The assets acquired from the lending programs bear risks. Stella (2009) projected possible
losses of the Federal Reserve System by assuming various default rates. Utilizing Stella￿ s
(2009) calculations and assumptions, the Federal Reserve System may lose $59 billion from
the emergency lending programs and $5 billion from the targeted lending programs. Even
though the interest rate risks for the security holdings and interest payments for the excess
reserves were not considered, the results indicate that the potential loss of the Federal Reserve
System could be roughly $64 billion. If the Federal Reserve System￿ s income falls below $64
billion during the period in which the system su⁄ers losses, then the quasi-￿scal policy
becomes active. Since the system￿ s average annual net income from 2003 to 2008 was $30
billion,21 there is a non-trivial possibility that quasi-￿scal policy could become active in the
U.S.
20Short term lending programs provide liquidity to ￿nancial institutions, which include discount window
lendings, Term Auction Facility and etc. Targeted lending programs try to ease credit conditions in the
commercial paper market as well as the credit market for households and small businesses. Emergency
lending programs support speci￿c ￿nancial institutions in distress, such as AIG and Bear Stearns.
21The Average of the ￿ Net income prior to distribution￿item at the Federal Reserve Banks Combined
Financial Statements, Annual Report of Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (various years).
265 Application 1: Exit strategy
Exit strategy refers to plans to reverse unconventional quasi-￿scal operations, such as credit
easing operations, as economic recovery and in￿ ation become imminent. Speci￿cally, the
Federal Reserve System will be required to ￿reduce excess reserve balances￿of depository
institutions or ￿neutralize their potential e⁄ects on broader measures of money and credit
and thus, on aggregate demand and in￿ ation￿(Bernanke, 2009c). Roughly explained, the
exit strategy is the plan to decrease the size of the central bank￿ s balance sheet by selling
the assets that have been acquired via unconventional operations.
This section analyzes the exit strategy￿ s potential e⁄ects on in￿ ation by extending the
benchmark model to include the long-term bonds. Although the primary policy intent of the
exit strategy is to avoid high in￿ ation due to large-scale excess liquidity in the economy, this
paper explores a di⁄erent aspect of the strategy. Suppose that the central bank increases
the short-term policy interest rate during the implementation of the exit strategy. Since
the central bank holds the long-term nominal bonds, an increase in the short-term rate may
devaluate the central bank￿ s long-term bond holdings. Then, through a portfolio adjustment
of the private agent as seen in Section 3, the valuation loss of the central bank may a⁄ect
in￿ ation in the AQFP regime. The interesting feature of this mechanism is that an increase
in the short-term rate (de￿ ationary policy) may lead to in￿ ation when the central bank￿ s
capital is negative.
In this extension, the long-term government nominal bonds are introduced. Speci￿cally,
B1;t is the face value of one-period nominal bonds issued at t period and B2;t refers to the
face value of two-period nominal bonds issued at t period. The short-term bonds B1;t mature
at t + 1 period and are redeemed for the nominal money value R1;tB1;t at t + 1 period. The
long-term bonds B2;t mature at t+2 period and are redeemed for the nominal money value
R2;tB2;t at maturity. R1;t and R2;t are the gross nominal interest rates for the short- and
long-term bonds, respectively.
At t period, the representative agent sells the premature long-term bonds (B2;t￿1) and
purchases the new long-term bonds (B2;t). The premature long-term bonds at period t
(B2;t￿1) are claims for the nominal money value R2;t￿1B2;t￿1 at t + 1 period. Instead of
trading the premature long-term bonds, the private agent has the option to invest in the
short-term bonds at t period. Since there should be no arbitrage opportunities, the two
risk-free investment choices (premature long-term bonds and short-term bonds) should have
the same return. Therefore, the market price of the premature long-term bonds at t period
is R2;t￿1R
￿1
1;t. For example, if a private agent invests R2;t￿1R
￿1
1;t dollars when purchasing one
27contract of the premature long-term bonds at t period, then she will receive R2;t￿1 dollars
at t + 1 period, since that is what the contract guarantees. In other words, the gross return
of investment on the premature long-term bonds is R1;t, which is equivalent to the return of
the short-term bonds between periods t and t + 1.

















































￿;t refers to the agent￿ s holdings of the short- and long-term bonds. If the constant
output assumption is maintained as seen in Section 3, then the Euler equations are Equations



























The additional Euler equation (44) implies the expectations theory of the term structure of
interest rates. In regard to the market clearing condition, the bonds market clearing condition
is revised as follows, while the money and goods market clearing conditions remain the same
















￿;t refers to the short- and long-term bond supplies and BC
￿;t is the central bank￿ s
demand for the bonds.23
The public sector model should also be extended. First, the central bank holds the long-
term government bonds, while the ￿scal authority issues the long-term bonds. Parallel to
the agent￿ s case, the central bank sells the premature long-term bonds in the market and
22Since the short-term gross interest rate was denoted by Rt in the previous sections, Rt is equivalent to
R1;t in this section.
23In addition, the de￿nition of the agent￿ s real ￿nancial wealth should be revised to include the long-term
bonds.
28purchases the newly issued long-term bonds. Then, the ￿ ow budget constraints of the central
























+ st ￿ ￿t: (48)
The quasi-￿scal policy rule (24) and the ￿scal policy rule (25) should be revised with long-
term bonds. The revised rules are:

















+  t: (50)
Second, the ￿scal authority and central bank decide the maturity structure of their lia-
bilities and assets. Cochrane (2001) showed that the maturity structure of the government
nominal debt a⁄ects the equilibrium price level sequence. In this model extension, the fol-
lowing maturity structure is suggested:
B2;t = ￿B1;t; (￿ ￿ 0); (51)
B
C
2;t = (￿ + ￿t)B
C
1;t; (52)
￿t = ￿￿￿t￿1 + "￿t; (0 ￿ ￿￿ < 1);
where ￿ is a policy parameter, "￿t is white noise and ￿t stands for the AR(1) exogenous
policy shock that a⁄ects the central bank￿ s asset maturity structure. In this speci￿cation
of the maturity structure, the ￿scal authority maintains a ￿xed ratio (￿) between the face
values of the short- and long-term bonds. The central bank maintains the same ratio (￿)24
for its assets in the steady state, while the bank￿ s asset maturity structure deviates from the
￿xed ratio (￿) when the policy shock ￿t exists.
The aforementioned maturity policy is such that the central bank (the ￿scal authority)
adjusts the short- and long-term assets (debts) that are outstanding at each time period.
Conversely, in Cochrane￿ s (2001) cases with the outstanding long-term bonds, it was assumed
that trade and redemption of premature long-term bonds were not allowed. Since this model
allows such transactions, the total face value of the outstanding assets is exposed to the
24The basic results of the model remain the same when the ￿scal authority￿ s debt maturity ratio is di⁄erent
from the asset maturity ratio of the central bank.
29valuation risk when the central bank adjusts its asset balances. That is, if the current short-
term interest rate (R1;t) increases, then the value of the premature long-term bonds decreases
through the decreased market price (R2;t￿1R
￿1
1;t).
This set-up is appropriate for analyzing issues of the exit strategy. When economic recov-
ery and in￿ ation are imminent, the Federal Reserve System may try to withdraw liquidity
from the economy by selling its assets. During that process, it is plausible that the Federal
Reserve System will be required to sell premature long-term bonds because a signi￿cant
portion of the system￿ s assets is contained within long-term bonds. Since the exit strat-
egy increases the short-term interest rate, the valuation loss from trading the premature
long-term bonds is relevant in the exit strategy.
By following the same steps as seen in Section 3, a linearized dynamic system is con-
structed for the vector of the endogenous variables (^ ￿t;^ bC
1;t;^ bA
1;t)0. The detailed speci￿cation
of the system and solution are described in Appendix C. If the policy parameter is a special














1 is the steady state value (real) of the central bank￿ s holdings for the short-term
bonds. Note that the solution (53) is equivalent to the solution in Section 3 (36) when no
long-term bonds are outstanding (￿ = 0).
The results show that when the central bank￿ s steady state capital level is negative
((1 + ￿)R1bC
1 ￿ m < 0), then the positive monetary policy shock ("￿t > 0) induces in￿ ation
(￿t > 0) in the AQFP regime. The economic mechanism is similar to that seen in Section
3. That is, the positive monetary policy shock devaluates the central bank￿ s asset accounts.
Then, in the AQFP regime, the agent will try to hold less money (when the central bank￿ s
capital is negative) since the policy shock has a negative e⁄ect on the value of the central
bank￿ s net liability. Therefore, the positive monetary policy shock induces surprise in￿ ation.
However, this outcome may not be desirable to the central bank because a positive monetary
policy shock is generally intended for mitigating in￿ ation.
Jeanne and Svensson (2007) pointed out that the negative capital of the central bank
may undermine the bank￿ s independence from the ￿scal authority. However, it is also true
that the central bank can still operate with negative capital. The results of this section show
that negative capital may not be desirable to the central banks, but for a di⁄erent reason.
That is, a tightening monetary policy shock may ignite further in￿ ation when the capital is
negative. This issue is relevant to the central banks with negative capital because the ￿scal
30authorities in such countries generally do not provide automatic ￿scal back-ups in order to
target the central bank￿ s capital, thus the quasi-￿scal policy is arguably active.
6 Application 2: Credit easing
This section extends the benchmark model by including a credit easing operation. Credit
easing is a policy strategy that attempts ￿to improve the functioning of credit markets and to
increase the supply of credit to households and businesses￿(Bernanke, 2009b). The Federal
Reserve System implemented credit easing operations by purchasing risky assets from private
agents. Therefore, this section introduces a risky asset into the central bank￿ s asset account.
As a result, it will be shown that the loss incurred by the central bank￿ s operations a⁄ect
in￿ ation in the AQFP regime.
In this extension of the model, the central bank makes a one-period loan (Lt) to the
agent, which is equivalent to the supply of the credit to the households and businesses in a
credit easing operation. That is, the agent receives money in the same amount as the loan
Lt at period t, then repays the loan in the next period with an interest payment. The gross
interest rate for Lt at period t+1 is denoted as RL
t+1, which is unknown at period t. In other
words, the return for the loan is a random variable and the loan is risky.












By assuming further that the nominal pricing kernel Xt;t+1
Pt
Pt+1 and the gross return of the
loan RL








As a convenient speci￿cation of RL
t+1 that satis￿es (55), I propose the following speci￿cation
R
L
t+1 = Rt + "Lt+1; (56)
where "Lt is white noise and refers to the random part of the return. The random part of
the return "Lt is an exogenous process that the central bank cannot control. In this case,
"Lt represents a random shock that occurs to the central bank￿ s earnings due to random
￿ uctuations in asset prices that are uncorrelated to its policy.
The central bank may ￿nance the loan either by printing money or by selling ￿scal
31authority bonds. If the loan is ￿nanced by issuing money, then the operation constitutes
the monetary policy shock (￿t) since the policy interest rate should be decreased while the
nominal money balance increases. In order to focus on the equilibrium in the AQFP regime
and the e⁄ect of the quasi-￿scal policy shock, let￿ s suppose that the central bank ￿xes the level
of the nominal money balance and sells ￿scal authority bonds to ￿nance the loan.25 Then,
in this model, the credit easing operation alters the composition of the central bank￿ s assets
by exchanging the risk-free ￿scal authority debt with the risky loan to the agent. In regard
to the agent￿ s portfolio, the agent￿ s asset (BA
t ) and liability (Lt) increase simultaneously due
to the operation. In sum, the agent borrows from the central bank and invests in the ￿scal
authority debt while the ￿scal authority debt held by the central bank decreases.
In actual policy implementations, the liquidity provided by the central bank is to be
used to ease the credit condition among private agents instead of being invested in the ￿scal
authority debt. Since this paper is based on a representative agent model without ￿nancial
frictions, the credit crunch issue is out of this paper￿ s scope. Nevertheless, since the focus of
this extension is on showing how the possible loss from the operation may a⁄ect in￿ ation in
a simple model, then the simpli￿ed model is still valid for analysis. In addition, the modeling
set-up is such that the credit easing operation is implemented by changing the central bank￿ s
asset composition. Bernanke (2009a) stated that ￿Federal Reserve￿ s credit easing approach
focuses on the mix of loans and securities that it holds and on how this composition of assets
a⁄ects credit conditions,￿whereas, in a quantitative easing operation ￿the composition of
loans and securities ... is incidental.￿Therefore, the set-up re￿ ects the actual policy intention
of the Federal Reserve System.
In order to focus on the possible e⁄ects of losses incurred by the operation, policy decisions
to adjust the level of the loan are also excluded from the model. That is, the central bank
is assumed to maintain the constant level of the loan￿ s real value. (Lt
Pt = l;8t) In other
words, the central bank does not have the policy freedom to adjust the level of the loan
due to an exogenous policy consideration (easing the credit condition), which cannot be
explicitly modeled in this extension. The real value of the loan can be modeled to follow an
exogenous stochastic process such as the AR(1) process, but the main result will remain the
same. Then, with a minor extension to Equation (12), the central bank￿ s budget constraint
25In the Federal Reserve System￿ s case, the loan to the private agent was ￿nanced both ways. That is,
the excess reserve held by banks increased signi￿cantly, which supported the asset purchases of the Federal
Reserve System.





















Suppose further that the policy regime is the AQFP regime as in (35). Then, the surprise
in￿ ation is a linear function of the transfer shock ("￿t), as well as the random return of the
loan ("Lt). Note that, in this case, the term quasi-￿scal shock includes a policy shock ("￿t)
and an exogenous shock ("Lt)
￿t =
￿2








A notable conclusion to this extension is that the loss incurred by the credit easing operation
("Lt < 0) has a de￿ ationary e⁄ect when the central bank￿ s steady state real capital (RbC +
Rl ￿ m) is positive. The economic mechanism underlying this result is the agent￿ s portfolio
adjustment as explained in Section 3. That is, the surprise earning shock (negative) of the
central bank makes the nominal money more valuable to the agent in an overall assessment.
Thus, the agent attempts to hold more money. Note that the result is analogous to the ￿scal
theory of the price level in the sense that a tax cut (or increase in a lump-sum transfer)
induces in￿ ation26 when the ￿scal policy is active.
The policy implication of the result is obvious. If policymakers are concerned with
de￿ ation (or in￿ ation) and the quasi-￿scal policy is active, then any loss incurred from the





The proposed policy (59) is actually guaranteed in the United Kingdom for the ￿ Asset Pur-
chase Facility￿of the Bank of England.27 On the other hand, if the quasi-￿scal policy is
passive, then the transfer from the ￿scal authority to the central bank su¢ ciently reacts to
the changes in the central bank￿ s capital. In other words, in order to isolate the possible
e⁄ects of the quasi-￿scal shocks on in￿ ation, the ￿scal authority￿ s automatic and immediate
funds transfer to the central bank is required regardless of whether the quasi-￿scal policy is
active or passive. Therefore, the ￿scal authority￿ s role in o⁄setting the shocks in the central
26The steady state real capital of the consolidated government is generally negative (￿RbA ￿ m < 0).
27Regardless of whether the Bank of England has an active quasi-￿scal policy, it is ￿indemni￿ed by the
Treasury from any losses arising out of or in connection with the Facility￿(Bank of England, 2009, p.1).
33bank￿ s capital is a prerequisite to price stabilization.
Traditionally, it has been argued that the quasi-￿scal operations of the central bank
may undermine monetary policy￿ s credibility and independence. Focusing on this point,
Goodfriend (1994, 2009) claimed that an ￿ accord￿between the two institutions is needed
in order to ensure the central banks￿independence. Although our reasoning is di⁄erent,
our analytic results support Goodfriend￿ s (2009) suggestion. That is, this paper shows that
the quasi-￿scal shocks a⁄ect in￿ ation when the ￿scal authority does not o⁄set the shocks
by targeting the central bank￿ s capital. Therefore, policy coordination between the two
institutions is indispensable for price stability.
7 Conclusion
Conventional macroeconomic models treat the central bank￿ s balance sheet as super￿cial
information that does not a⁄ect the equilibrium. However, this paper shows that quasi-￿scal
policies, which alter the central bank￿ s balance sheet, a⁄ect the equilibrium in￿ ation in a
certain policy regime. In the active quasi-￿scal policy regime, the transfer rule between
the ￿scal authority and central bank does not automatically stabilize the central bank￿ s
real capital while monetary and ￿scal policies are passive. In this policy regime, the quasi-
￿scal shocks, including the losses incurred from the credit easing operations, a⁄ect in￿ ation
via the private agent￿ s portfolio adjustment. Previous studies, which have not considered
this possibility, implicitly assume that the quasi-￿scal policy is always passive. However, in
general circumstances, the policy￿ s passivity is not guaranteed. In other words, it can be
an illusionary belief that the ￿scal authority will always automatically support the central
bank￿ s losses considering the actual laws on the central banks.
The crucial assumption needed for these results is the budgetary independence of the
central banks. The budgetary independence of the central banks implies that the real value
of central banks￿net liability has a ￿nite upper bound, which is the present value of seignior-
age and transfer earnings. This paper also shows that the condition is satis￿ed under general
circumstances. When the budgetary independence condition is satis￿ed, an additional equi-
librium condition exists, which is referred to as the central bank￿ s net liability valuation
formula, and the formula may or may not restrict in￿ ation process depending on the active-
ness of quasi-￿scal policy.
The economic mechanism underlying the equilibrium in the active quasi-￿scal policy
regime is the private agent￿ s response to the quasi-￿scal shocks. When a shock occurs to
the central bank￿ s earnings in this policy regime, the agent tries to adjust her portfolio
34between the central bank￿ s liability and consumption, thus the shock a⁄ects in￿ ation. This
mechanism is comparable to the asset pricing relationships, which equate the value of an
asset with the present value of the asset￿ s current and future earnings. That is, the central
bank￿ s net liability valuation formula is an asset pricing equation where the general price
level is the price of the bank￿ s liability with respect to consumption.
By extending the benchmark model, this paper shows that the issues of an exit strategy
and a credit easing operation may a⁄ect in￿ ation in undesirable ways. If the policy regime is
active quasi-￿scal policy during the implementation of the exit strategy, then the monetary
policy shock may a⁄ect in￿ ation through the central bank￿ s net liability valuation formula.
Notably, the contractionary monetary policy shock induces in￿ ation when the central bank￿ s
capital is negative. If the central bank su⁄ers losses from the credit easing operation in
the active quasi-￿scal policy regime, then the loss induces de￿ ation. Therefore, the ￿scal
authority and central bank should coordinate, by stabilizing the central bank￿ s capital, in
order to isolate the perverse e⁄ects of quasi-￿scal shocks on in￿ ation.
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36Appendix A. Part of the proof for Proposition 1
Conditions (15) and (16) imply that Conditions (17) and (18) hold. By summing the ￿ ow
budget constraints (12) and (13) over the period from t to T ￿1 after taking the discounted

































Et [Xt;s (ss ￿ ￿s)]: (A2)




















Et [Xt;s (ss ￿ ￿s)] ￿ 0: (A4)



























































￿ ￿ < 1 and the Conditions (15) and (16) imply dC
t ;dF









































Conversely, Conditions (A10) and (A11) imply that assumptions (15) and (16) hold.
Suppose that Conditions (A10) and (A11) are true. From the budget constraints, Equations
(A1) and (A2) are true. As T ! 1 in Equations (A1) and (A2), Conditions (A3) and (A4)
hold by equality. Then, since dC
t and dF
t are ￿nite, Conditions (15) and (16) are necessarily
true. Therefore, Conditions (15) and (16) are equivalent to Conditions (A10) and (A11).
Appendix B. Solution of the dynamic system in Section 3
In order to arrange the model with a linear dynamic system, this paper linearizes the Fisher
equation (28) and the budget constraints ((12) and (13)). These three equations form a
dynamic system in matrix equation (A12). The ￿rst row of (A12) is from the Fisher equation,
the second row is from the central bank budget constraint and the third row is from the ￿scal
authority budget constraint. The money market equilibrium condition (27) and the policy
rules ((23), (24) and (25)) are substituted into the three equations. In the coe¢ cient matrices































￿1 ￿ ￿Q 0
’5 ￿










































































































38If the vectors xt and zt are stacked, then the system (A12) becomes Equation (A13).
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6




















6 6 6 6 6 6
6 6 6
4
￿￿ 0 0 ￿ 0 0
’6 ￿
￿1 ￿ ￿Q 0 ’7 ￿￿ 0
’8 0 ￿
￿1 ￿ ￿F ’9 0 ￿￿ 
0 0 0 ￿￿ 0 0
0 0 0 0 ￿￿ 0
0 0 0 0 0 ￿ 
3
7

























6 6 6 6 6
6 6 6 6
4
1 0 0 0 0 0
￿’1 0 0 ’3 1 0
’1 ￿ ’4 0 0 ￿’3 0 ￿1
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
3
7 7 7 7





6 6 6 6 6









7 7 7 7 7





where ’6 ￿ ’2 ￿ ￿￿’1;’7 ￿ ￿￿’3 ￿ ￿’1 + ￿
￿1’2;
’8 ￿ ￿￿(’1 ￿ ’4) ￿ ’2 + ’5;’9 ￿ ￿￿￿’3 + ￿
￿1’8:
The eigenvalues of transition matrix A can be read o⁄from the diagonal elements. By the
eigenvector decomposition, matrix A can be decomposed into P￿P ￿1 where ￿ is a diagonal
matrix with eigenvalues, and the columns of the P matrix are the right eigenvectors of A.











p1 1 0 p2 p3 0
p4 0 1 p5 0 p6
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
3
7 7 7








































￿1 ￿ ￿F ￿ ￿ 
:
The solution of the system is derived by eliminating the explosive eigenvalues. If the j￿ th
eigenvalue is explosive, then the solution is such that P j￿Yt = 0 where P j￿ refers to the j￿ th
row of P ￿1. The linear mappings from the exogenous shock to the endogenous forecast error
are given by P j￿C￿t = 0.
Appendix C. Solution of the dynamic system in Section 5
The linear dynamic system in Section 5 is derived by linearizing the Fisher equation (28)
and the budget constraints ((47) and (48)). The money market equilibrium condition (27),
the term structure equilibrium condition (44) and the policy rules ((23), (49), (50), (51) and































￿1 ￿ ￿Q 0
’9 ￿






















































￿ 0 0 0
’5 ’6 0 0






























































































































By stacking the vectors xt and zt, the system (A15) becomes Equation (A16).
2
6 6 6 6 6
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6 6 6 6 6
6 6 6 6 6 6
4
￿￿ 0 0 ￿ 0 0 0
’14 ￿




￿1 ￿ ￿F ’18 ’19 0
￿￿ 
1+￿
0 0 0 ￿￿ 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 ￿￿ 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 ￿￿ 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 ￿ 
3
7 7 7 7 7
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6 6 6 6
6 6 6 6 6 6
6
4
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
’7 ￿ ’1 0 0 ’3 ’4
1
1+￿ 0
’20 0 0 ’10 ￿ ’3 ￿’4 0 ￿1
1+￿
0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1
3
7 7 7 7






6 6 6 6











7 7 7 7






where ’14 ￿ ’2 ￿ ￿￿’1;’15 ￿ ￿￿’3 ￿ ￿’1 + ’5;’16 ￿ ￿￿’4 + ’6;
’17 ￿ ￿￿(’1 ￿ ’8) ￿ ’2 + ’9;’18 ￿ ￿￿(’10 ￿ ’3) + ￿(’1 ￿ ’8) ￿ ’5 + ’11;
’19 ￿ ￿￿￿’4 ￿ ’6 + ’12;’20 ￿ ’1 ￿ ’7 ￿ ’8 + ’13:
41Then, the transition matrix A is decomposed into P￿P ￿1 where the columns of P are right




6 6 6 6





￿￿￿￿￿ 0 0 0
p1 1 0 p2 p3 p4 0
p5 0 1 p6 p7 0 p8
0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1
3
7 7 7 7













































￿1 ￿ ￿F ￿ ￿￿
;p8 ￿
￿￿ (1 + ￿)￿1
￿
￿1 ￿ ￿F ￿ ￿ 
:
When j￿ th eigenvalue is explosive, the linear mappings from the exogenous shocks to the
endogenous forecast error are given by P j￿C￿t = 0 where P j￿ refers to the j￿ th row of P ￿1.
42